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How Do They Do That? Automatism, Coercion, Necessity and Mens Rea in Scots Criminal Law 
Claire McDiarmid* 
 
Introduction 
The provision of defences in the criminal law is perhaps the first and most basic requirement of 
equality of arms.  The criminal justice system (in both Scotland and England and Wales) is set up so 
that, initially, the state applies its resources to prove that the accused carried out the proscribed 
conduct with the requisite mental attitude.  There is then an opportunity for the defendant to 
present to the court exculpatory evidence.  General defences formalise this second process, creating 
defined mechanisms in terms of which the accused may put forward  “ŐŽŽĚ ?Žƌ ůĞŐĂůůǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ
reasons for his/her conduct which, in law, will render him/her criminally blameless.  This chapter will 
consider the defences of automatism, coercion, and necessity as these are defined in Scots law.  It 
will examine particularly the way in which these defences operate in relation to the negation of 
mens rea looking at whether this is the central basis of the exculpation which they offer. 
 
The Structure of the Criminal Law following Drury 
The role of defences, and the way in which they function to provide exoneration in Scots law, was 
put under scrutiny by the decision of a five-judge bench in an appeal to the High Court of Justiciary 
in the case of Drury v HM Advocate.1  At his trial, Stuart Drury had pled the partial defence of 
provocation to a charge of murdering his former partner.  He was, nonetheless, convicted of murder 
and appealed on the basis that the test of provocation, where the provoking act was the discovery of 
sexual infidelity, had been wrongly explained to the jury as one of proportionality.2  In principle, 
then, all that the appeal court was required to determine was this limited issue: the test for 
provocation in these circumstances.  In fact, it effected a change to the mens rea of murder itself 
                                                          
* Reader, Law School, University of Strathclyde 
1 2001 SLT 1013 
2 Only two provoking acts are recognised in Scots law  W an initial attack by the ultimate deceased (see Gillon v 
Advocate 2007 JC 24 and the discovery of sexual infidelity the test for which was clarified in Drury (n 1).  For a 
ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁƐĞĞůĂŝƌĞDĐŝĂƌŵŝĚ ? “ŽŶ ?ƚ>ŽŽŬĂĐŬŝŶŶŐĞƌ PdŚĞWĂƌƚŝĂůĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨWƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
^ĐŽƚƐƌŝŵŝŶĂů>Ăǁ ?ŝŶ:ĂŵĞƐŚĂůŵĞƌƐ ?&ŝŽŶa Leverick and Lindsay Farmer (eds), Essays in Criminal Law in 
Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 195-217 
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ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐŽ ŝŶ Ă ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ?  “threaten[ed] to turn the Scottish law of criminal defences upside 
down. ?3 
Prior to Drury, two alternative mentes reae for murder existed.  These can be summarised as 
 “ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŬŝůů ?ĂŶĚ “ǁŝĐŬĞĚƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?4  In the case, from the outset of his dicta on the first 
form (intention to kill), Lord Justice-General Rodger seemed to envisage a coming together of mental 
element and defence.  He said: 
as it stands, the definition [ie, in summary, intention to kill] ... is at best 
incomplete and, to that extent, inaccurate. Most obviously, someone who is 
subject to a murderous attack may defend himself by intentionally killing his 
assailant.  ...  But, of course, a person who intentionally kills in self defence is 
not guilty of murder or indeed of any other crime.5 
Accordingly, he went on to argue that the first form (intention to kill) ǁĂƐŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ P “The definition 
of murder in the direction is somewhat elliptical because it does not describe the relevant intention. 
In truth, just as the recklessness has to be wicked so also must the intention be wicked. ?6  An 
intention to kill, then, had ceased to be sufficient for murder ?  “tŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨthat intention also 
had to be established.  Further on, Lord Justice-General Rodger explained that provocation did not 
 “ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ?ŵƵƌĚĞƌƚŽĐƵůƉĂďůĞŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞďƵƚǁĂƐ “simply one of the factors which the jury should take 
into account in performing their general task of determining the accused's state of mind at the time 
when he killed his victim. ?7  In short, if the accused had been provoked, then, while s/he would still 
have intended to kill, that intention would be shorn of its wickedness.  A conviction for culpable 
homicide would still be apposite but the mens rea of murder  ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŶŽǁ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ Ă  “wicked 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?would not have been made out. 
Thus, as a number of commentators pointed out,8 the all but mathematical equation which had 
previously been applied in Scottish criminal procedure (actus reus + mens rea = crime unless there is 
                                                          
3 :ĂŵĞƐŚĂůŵĞƌƐ ? “ŽůůĂƉƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝŵŝŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^>d ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
4 dŚĞ “ĐůĂƐƐŝĐ ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝded by JHA Macdonald in his Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of 
Scotland (5th edn by James Walker and D J Stevenson, W Green, 1948) 89 
5 Drury (n 1) [10] 
6 Ibid [11]. 
7 Ibid [17].  This view was shared by Lord Nimmo Smith in his judgment ibid [3]. 
8 dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ĚŽŶĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ďǇ ŚĂůŵĞƌƐ  ?Ŷ  ? ? ?  /Ŷ Ă ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ? 'ĞƌĂůĚ 'ŽƌĚŽŶ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ P  “/ƚ
seemed that what the court has done has been to incorporate the defences to the crime of murder into the 
definition of the crime by using the word 'wicked' as a shorthand for all of them.  ...  I remain uneasy, however, 
about the concept of 'wicked intention' in the context of a modern system of law ... And this is apart from the 
fact that it is, I think, analytically helpful to distinguish between the definition of a crime, and matters which 
ĐĂŶ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?(Commentary to Drury (n 1) 2001 SCCR 583 at 618-19.)  See also 
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Ă ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ƐĞĞŵĞĚ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ ?  KŶ >ŽƌĚ ZŽĚŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?mens rea could not be 
made out without consideration of any defence which might negate it.  Mens rea and defences 
appeared to be collapsing into each other. 
Of course, this state of affairs applied directly only to murder but murder is something of a 
figurehead or motif for the rest of the criminal law  W partly by virtue of its symbolic status as the 
most serious crime, partly, perhaps, because it is one of few crimes where the degree of culpability 
may be considered at the stage of determining guilt (in the possibility of the return of a culpable 
ŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞǀĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƚƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŚůŽĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚ “ũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ
on the mens rea of homicide have genuine influence over the rest of the law, rather than being 
ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĂƚƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?9  Rather more graphically, Gordon has stated that 
There is no doubt that the law of murder still lives in the shadow of the 
gallows, or that discussions of mens rea in general tend to be influenced by 
cases of murder, if only because most of the cases on mens rea were murder 
cases.10 
Arguably, in relation to murder, a common sense view has prevailed that the mens rea of wicked 
intention to kill is established where the accused intended to kill and no recognised defence 
applies.11  /ŶƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ “[w]e reject any suggestion that the question of the wickedness of an intention 
to kill is at large for the jury in every case, or that the determination of that question is not 
constrained by any legal limits ?12 the case of Elsherkisi v HM Advocate reined in some of the 
uncertainty arising from Drury.  Elsherkisi did not, however, lay bare the underlying structural issue 
as to the relationship between mens rea and defences.13  Given the way in which murder permeates 
the legal landscape, then, this may still be of importance in relation to other general defences.  Even 
if this is not the case, their own relationship to mens rea (and, indeed, actus reus) is highlighted as 
worthy of consideration by the way in which the matter was dissected by Drury ?Ɛfive-judge bench.  
Accordingly, this chapter will now turn its attention to automatism, coercion and necessity in Scots 
law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
DŝĐŚĂĞů '  ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞ ?  “The Coherence of Scots Criminal Law: Some Aspects of Drury v HM Advocate [2002] 
Juridical Review 273 especially 281-84.  
9  “Criminal Law and the Scottish Moral Tradition ? ?WŚƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10 Commentary to Petto v HM Advocate 2011 SCCR 519, 534.  See also Pamela R Ferguson and Claire 
McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis (Dundee University Press 2009) para 9.2.1 
11 See Elsherkisi v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 100, 2011 SCCR 735; 2012 SCL 181 [11]-[13] 
12 Ibid [12] (Lord Hardie) 
13 Ibid especially [12] 
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The Operation of Automatism 
Automatism is an interesting defence for a number of reasons, including that its appearance in the 
Scottish case reports is so patchy, with a successful plea in 1925 in HM Advocate v Ritchie14 (though 
the defence was not so called in the report) followed by a barren period until 199115 when success in 
Ross v HM Advocate16 brought a (small!) glut  W in all of which cases the defence ultimately failed.17  
Another interesting side-issue is that the interpretation of the facts of Ritchie which, to an extent, 
underpinned the decision in Ross may not have been entirely correct.18  Finally, in terms of its 
theoretical basis,19 while automatism ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?ŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĞŝƚŚĞƌ
as an excuse  W  “ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚĚŝĚǁĂƐǁƌŽŶŐďƵƚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇƐ ?ŚĞŝƐ
ŶŽƚ ďůĂŵĞǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? Žƌ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĞŵƉƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚ ?  In Ross, the statement of the principles of automatism drew 
ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŶƐĂŶŝƚǇ ŝŶ ^ĐŽƚƐ ůĂǁ  ? “ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?20 but that 
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ŶŽǁŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ “ŵĞŶƚĂůĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŝŶ its recent passage into legislation.21 
For present purposes, interest is directed towards ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?Ɛ actual operation in terms of the 
way in which the courts apply it to elide blameworthiness.  There appears to have been no 
significant case since Drury.  Thus, ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŶŽŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂ
free-standing defence coming into play after establishment of actus reus and mens rea.  We may 
therefore accept that it is correct to characterise it as working solely to demonstrate tŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ
lack of culpability where, prima facie, there is clear evidence that s/he is the medium by which the 
proscribed harm constituting the gravamen of the charge has been brought about.  In his judgment 
in Ross, Lord McCluskey made no bones about this.  He said:  ‘I know of no exceptions, other than 
statutory ones, to the rule that the Crown must prove mens rea beyond reasonable doubt.  ...  If 
                                                          
14 1926 JC 45 
15 Though accused persons did occasionally seek to use the plea in this period.  See, for example, Stevenson v 
Beatson 1965 SLT (Sh Ct) 11. 
16 1991 JC 210 
17 Sorley v HM Advocate 1992 JC 102; Cardle v Mulrainey 1992 SLT 1152; Ebsworth v HM Advocate 1992 SLT 
1161. 
18 ^ĞĞ:ĞŶŝĨĞƌDZŽƐƐ ? “>ŽŶŐDŽƚŽƌZƵŶŽŶĂĂƌŬEŝŐŚƚ PZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐHM Advocate v Ritchie ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
Edin LR  ? ? ? ?dŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚǁĂƐĂĚǀĞƌƐĞůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇ “ƚŽǆŝĐĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?dŚŝƐƉŚƌĂƐĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚĂŬĞŶƚŽ
mean toxic car exhaust fumes (a ĨĂĐƚŽƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ? ? ZŽƐƐ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
presented in the trial uncovered that, in fact, it referred to a medical condition arising from injuries sustained 
in the First World War (which might have been characterised as an internal factor). 
19 See, for example, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Lacey, Wells & Quick Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials (4th edn, 2010 Cambridge University Press) 119-23 
20 Baron David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes, vol I (4th edn, 1844 The Law 
Society of Scotland 1986 reprint) 37 
21 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 51A 
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there were to be no such evidence at all the proper verdict even in such a case would be a simple 
verdict of "not guilty". ?22 
Ross then, falls back on what may be regarded as the logical order of the criminal law (mens rea 
(delineated narrowly as the specific, proscribed mental state in the offence definition) + actus reus) = 
crime unless automatism applies.  In other words, proof of the absence of automatism is not 
required to establish the mens rea of the crime charged.  The defence is a separate and subsequent 
issue.  Unlike Drury ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ “ũƵƐƚ ?ŽŶĞŽĨƐĞǀĞƌĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚe 
ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ŝƐ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĐůĞĂƌ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
Nonetheless, these relate so closely to the presence or absence of mens rea (and/or actus reus) that 
ŝƚ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ ŵƵĐŚ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ĂƐ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůǇ ƚŽ ĞůŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ĐƵůƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  “ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽŽĨ ? ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ĂŶ  “ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂƌĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƉƌŽǀĞĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?23  How, then, does automatism work?  
We may deal with its principles in short compass.  &ŝƌƐƚƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞ “some external factor which 
was outwith the accused's control and which he was not bound to foresee. ?24  The case offers some 
examples of external factors for this purpose including  ‘the consumption of drink or drugs ? or  ‘toxic 
exhaust fumes ?,25  ‘ĂďůŽǁŽŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚĐĂƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ‘the administering of an anaesthetic for 
therapeutic purposes ?.26  The external factor must also  ‘have resulted in a total alienation of reason 
amounting to a complete absence of self-ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?.27  The facts of Ross provide a clear illustration.  
The accused had been drinking lager from a can into which, without his knowledge, had been put, 
five or six Temazepam tablets and an unspecified quantity of LSD which he then ingested with the 
ůĂŐĞƌ ?dŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĚƌƵŐƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚƚŚĞ “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĨ ĐƚŽƌ ? ?Shortly after ingestion, Ross started 
to scream and to lunge with a knife, attacking a number of people such that he was eventually 
charged with seven counts of attempted murder (among other offences).  Ross was convicted at trial 
and appealed.  The defence argued that the drugs had adversely affected his ability to exercise self-
control and to formulate mens rea. 
Essentially, automatism goes to the very roots of the capacity-based approach to the attribution of 
criminal responsibility which requires that individuals exercise freewill and understanding in making 
the choice to commit crime and that the circumstances are such that they would have had a fair 
                                                          
22 Ross (n 16) 228 
23 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (W Green, 2006) para 1.06 
24 Ross (n 16) 218 (LJ-G Hope) 
25 Ibid 214 (LJ-G Hope) 
26 Ibid 216 (LJ-G Hope quoting Lord Diplock in R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156, 172) 
27 Ibid 218 (LJ-G Hope) 
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chance to do otherwise.28  If avoidance of the criminal behaviour was impossible in an individual 
case then, no liability should attach.  At the risk of oversimplification, to be subject to the norms of 
the criminal law, conduct must be voluntary.  ƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ  “involuntariness ?
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŶŐĞƐƚŝŽŶŽƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌŽƌƚŚĞƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ?
activity or both.29 
In Ross, the appeal court characterised the matter as ĂŶŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽŶƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚƚŽĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞ
mens rea.30  If the issue is one of involuntariness, however, then this compels us to consider firstly 
whether, in fact, the accused acted at all.  In other words, there may be a case that it is the actus 
reus with which automatism engages and which it operates to negate, without any need to consider 
at all its role in mens rea.31  At one level, this is compelling.  Involuntariness equates, or is certainly 
taken to equate, to the negation of criminality tout court.  Indeed, in summarising the Crown 
submissions, Lord Justice-'ĞŶĞƌĂů,ŽƉĞŶŽƚĞĚ ?  “I understood [the Solicitor General] to accept that 
there was evidence that the appellant had no control over his actions with the result that they were 
involuntary. ?32 
In practice, however, it would appear that there are degrees of voluntariness (of acting) all of which 
are on a continuum towards the mental element of strongly intending.  On this analysis then, the 
actus reus and the mens rea of any crime cannot be completely separated from each other.  Gordon 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ P “dŽďĞĐůĂƐƐĞĚĂƐĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŵƵƐƚďĞ ǁŚŽůůǇƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ?ĂŶd a person who 
ĂĐƚƐǁŚĞŶŚŝƐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ?ŝŵƉĂŝƌĞĚŽƌŵĞƌĞůǇĐůŽƵĚĞĚŝƐŶŽƚĂĐƚŝŶŐĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ?33 
Scots law has recognised the absence (which may be different from the negation) of the actus reus 
in the case of Hogg v Macpherson34 where a strŽŶŐ ŐƵƐƚ ŽĨ ǁŝŶĚ ďůĞǁ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ŚŽƌƐĞ-
drawn furniture van and it, in turn, knocked a municipal lamp standard to the ground, breaking the 
ďƵůď ?/ƚǁĂƐŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “breaking of the lamp was not the appellant's act at all, either negligent or 
accidental. ?35  It was the wind.  In automatism cases, on the other hand, a proscribed act will have 
ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ? Ross, for example, stabbed a number of people.  It is unclear 
whether it is this proximity to mediating the wrongful behaviour which has left the actus reus in 
                                                          
28 This is famously iterated by HLA Hart in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 
(Clarendon Press 1968) especially Chapter 1. 
29 See, for example Gerald H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland vol I, (3rd edn by Michael G A Christie, W 
Green 2000) para 3.16; TH Jones & MGA Christie, Criminal Law (5th edn, W Green 2012) from para 4-11 
30 Ross (n 16) 231-14 (LJ-G Hope) 
31 dŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚďǇ ?ĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?WĂŵĞůĂ&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ?^ĞĞ “dŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:>^^ ? ? ? ? 
32 Ross (n 16) 214 
33 Gordon (n 29) para 3.16 
34 1928 JC 15 
35 Ibid 17 (LJ-G Clyde) 
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ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ĐĂƐĞƐ Žƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ƵƐŝŶŐ  “ŝŶƐĂŶŝƚǇ ?
ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ƚŽ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ?  ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
suggested that no criminal ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂƚƚĂĐŚ ƚŽ Ă  “ƌĞĂů ? ƌĞĨůĞǆ ĂĐƚ ?36  Nonetheless, while 
automatism has been pled to a strict liability charge, with no apparent difficulty, though, equally, 
with no specific discussion,37 ƚŚĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŽ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞ ŽŶ ŝƚƐeffect in 
relation to mens rea. 
The real issue in Ross was whether a mental condition which did not meet the legal definition of 
insanity could offer exculpation.  This was not in terms of the actual mental state in which Ross 
committed the offences  W no one seems to have doubted that it amounted to Ă “ƚŽƚĂůĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?  /ƚǁĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐĐĂƵƐĞ ? At the time, insanity required that that mental state should 
arise ³as the result of mental illness, mental disease or defect or unsoundness of mind ? ?38  ZŽƐƐ ?Ɛ
mental state arose from the ingestion of drugs.  Ross was not at fault for this however.  The 
ingestion was involuntary.39  At one level, then, all that Ross determined was that, in these 
circumstances a defence (automatism) was available.  All of the judges characterised it as the 
absence of mens rea40 but, clearly, if the Crown is unable to prove mens rea in any case, the accused 
must be acquitted.  dŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?s real innovation was its affirmation that that particular reason for the 
absence of mens rea  W an external factor neither self-induced nor foreseeable  W was acceptable in 
ůĂǁ ?  /ƚ ŝƐ ĂƐ Ă ĨŽƌŵĂů ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ŵĂǇ ďƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞntion that 
his/her reason was alienated blamelessly that automatism operates as a defence.41 
Mens rea must be completely absent.  Automatism is not comparable, in that sense, to diminished 
responsibility where the accused may retain some ability to rationalise thought and behaviour.42  
This was clarified in the case of Cardle v Mulrainey43 where Lord Justice-General Hope stated: 
Where ... the accused knew what he was doing and was aware of the nature 
and quality of his acts and that what he was doing was wrong, he cannot be 
                                                          
36 See Jessop v Johnstone 1991 SCCR 238, 240 (LJ-C Ross) 
37 See Mulrainey (n 17) where the accused was charged with a number of road traffic offences, some of which 
were of strict liability.  See also Ferguson and McDiarmid (n 10) from para 20.20.2 
38 Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38, 45 (LJ-G Emslie) 
39 No matter its effect on actual mental state, voluntary intoxication is not a defence in Scots law: Hume (n 20) 
45; Brennan (ibid) 46; Ross (n 16) 214 (LJ-G Hope) 
40
 Ross (n 16) 213-14 (LJ-G Hope); 221 (Lord Allanbridge); 229 (Lord McCluskey); 232 (Lord Brand).  Lord Weir 
did not specifically refer to the absence of mens rea but stated at 232 P “the state of mind of the accused is at 
the heart of the issue ?  
41 It is recognised as a defence in terms of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 78(2). 
42 The legal test in Scotland is one of substantial impairment of the ability to determine or control conduct by 
reason of abnormality of mind: Ibid, s 51B(1) 
43 (n 17) 
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said to be suffering from some total alienation of reason in regard to the crime 
with which he is charged which the defence requires.  ... [An] inability to exert 
self control, which the [first instance judge] has described as an inability to 
complete the reasoning process, must be distinguished from the essential 
requirement that there should be a total alienation of the accused's mental 
faculties of reasoning and of understanding what he is doing. As in the case of 
provocation, which provides another example of a stimulus resulting in a loss 
of self control at the time of the act, this may mitigate the offence but it 
cannot be held to justify an acquittal on the ground that there is an absence of 
mens rea.44 
In this case, the accused had ingested amphetamine which had been introduced, without his 
knowledge, into a can of lager from which he had been drinking.  He was aware that what he was 
doing (he committed a number of motoring offences) was wrong but claimed that the effect of the 
external factor (the amphetamine) was that he was unable to stop himself doing so. 
The reference to provocation is perhaps unhelpful here in that automatism, even if pled to murder, 
would not constitute a partial defence.  It operates on an all-or-nothing basis.  The accused in Cardle 
v Mulrainey was charged, inter alia, with attempted theft, the mens rea of which is an intention to 
deprive the owner of his/her property.  His automatism plea was based on volition  W indeed it was 
an almost textbook one ŽĨ  “ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶ ŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ?ŽƌƚŽcontrol action.  While this is a key 
component of criminal capacity on the Hartian definition espoused above, it was not specifically 
considered.  For those offences for which it was necessary, bearing in mind that a number of the 
charges against Mulrainey related to strict liability crimes, the accused was held to have mens rea.  
The court must be deemed to have considered that this rested on criminal capacity, defined, 
presumably in a restricted fashion to include only understanding of the nature of the behaviour.45  
Perhaps the argument is that, if some rationality is retained, no impulse is, in fact, irresistible.  The 
conceptual difficulty (in relation to the strict liability offences) of holding that automatism operates 
in relation to mens rea was similarly not addressed. 
If it can be accepted, then, that automatism works by setting up, in law, as a good reason for a 
complete loss of rationality, the application to the accused of an external factor, one further 
question remains: why should a factor internal to the accused but having the same effect not also 
serve the same exculpatory function?  The basic answer to this, arising from the doctrine of 
                                                          
44 Ibid, 1160 
45 For a full discussion of one possible view of the relationship between mens rea and criminal capacity, see 
Claire McDiarmid, Childhood and Crime (Dundee University Press, 2007) Chapter 3 
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precedent, is found in the case of Cunningham v HM Advocate46 in which the line of defence put 
forward (to a number of motoring offences) was that the accused had committed these whilst in the 
throes of ĂŶ  “ĞƉŝůĞƉƚŝĐ ĨƵŐƵĞ ? ?47  Lord Justice-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ůǇĚĞ ƐĂŝĚ P  “Any mental or pathological 
condition short of insanity ? any question of diminished responsibility owing to any cause, which 
does not involve insanity ? is relevant only to the question of mitigating circumstances and 
sentence. ?48  Ross expressly overruled this principle in relation to external factors.  Scots law has 
accepted (at sheriff court level only but subsequent to Ross) that hypoglycaemia caused by diabetes 
could constitute an external factor49 but only where it was a first attack.  If the accused knew that 
s/he suffered from diabetes, the foreseeability strand of the Ross test could not be satisfied.  The 
underlying justification is public safety in that conditions of this nature might recur.50  The 
application of an external factor (the spiking of a drink etc) is, by its nature, a one-off. 
Some aspects of automatism do remain somewhat obscure.  Its definition of the mental state 
required for exculpation is based on an old formulation of the insanity defence which no longer 
applies in Scotland.  There is no indication of whether this might, or, indeed, should, change in line 
with the shift to inability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the conduct which is now the 
basis of the defence of mental disorder.51  ƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐůŝŬĞĞƉŝůĞƉƐǇ
and diabetes, which may be difficult to control,52 is still rudimentary and may not properly capture 
blameworthiness.  Overall, however, where an accused has, without fault, lost all rational control of 
his/her actions, criminal liability is inappropriate and automatism recognises this where the cause is 
an unforeseeable external factor which was not self-induced.  While the effect of the defence on the 
foundational elements of the crime charged is, necessarily, direct, these elements remain intact.  
Automatism does not affect the boundary between offence and defence.  It is necessary now to 
consider this issue in relation to coercion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 1963 JC 80 
47 Ibid, 83 
48 Ibid, 84 
49 MacLeod v Mathieson 1993 SCCR 488 
50 Ross (n 18) 203 
51 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 51A(1) 
52 For a discussion of certain aspects of the English position, see :ZƵŵďŽůĚĂŶĚDtĂƐŝŬ ? “ŝĂďĞƚŝĐĚƌŝǀĞƌƐ ?
ŚǇƉŽŐůǇĐĂĞŵŝĐƵŶĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Crim LR 863 
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Coercion 
Introduction 
Coercion has been recognised in Scots law since the time of Baron David Hume53 and, indeed, the 
modern law (in which there are few cases) rests on his exposition.54  Developments in the defence of 
necessity55 have brought some overlap however the two defences have not been collapsed into a 
generalised form of duress and, for that reason, they will be discussed separately.  The essence of 
coercion is that the accused was forced, by threats made against him/her by a third party, to commit 
ĂĐƌŝŵĞ ?/ƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞůĂǁĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƐƵĐŚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƚŚĞmens rea for the crime is most clearly discernible.  There is both a 
factual and a normative element to that characterisation. 
 
Key Principles 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,ƵŵĞ ?ĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ “ĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ
or great bodily harm [and] an inability to resist the ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?56  The implicit emphasis on the effect 
on the accused of the fear thus generated is discernible in some attempts to explain the modern 
law.  In his charge to the jury in HM Advocate v Raiker57 for example, Lord McCluskey stated: 
the law is that where a person has a real, a genuine, a justifiable fear that if he 
does not act in accordance with the orders of another person, that other person 
will use life-threatening violence against him or cause it to be used, and if as a 
result of that fear and for no other reason he carries out acts which have all the 
typical external characteristics of criminal acts like assault or theft, then in that 
situation he cannot be said to have the evil intention which the law says is a 
necessary ingredient in the carrying out of a crime. In other words, he lacks the 
criminal state of mind that is a necessary ingredient of any crime, he lacks the 
                                                          
53 The first edition of his Commentaries was published in 1797 with the fourth and final version issued in 1844 
(n 20). 
54 Ibid, 53 
55 See Moss v Howdle 1997 JC 123 
56 Hume (n 20) 53.  He also required (ibid)  “ĂďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚĂŶĚŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ănd a disclosure 
ŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƉŽŝů ?ŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐĂĨĞĂŶĚĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶHM Advocate v 
Thomson 1983 JC 69 these were considered not to be conditions of the use of the defence but rather merely 
 “measures of the accused's credibility and reliability on the issue of the defence. ? (ibid 78 (LJ-C Wheatley)) 
57 1989 SCCR 149 
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evil intention which I have sought to describe earlier and which is part of my 
description or definition of assault.58 
This explanation, given for the use of the lay members of the jury, seems straightforwardly to 
indicate that coercion operates to elide mens rea.  There is no issue in relation to the actus reus: the 
accused acted in a way which was willed.  We see again, here, however, the existence of the 
continuum mentioned above in relation to automatism between acting voluntarily59 and directly 
intending an outcome.  The essence of coercion, on this explanation, is that the accused was so 
frightened by the threat made against him/her that s/he acted in a way in which s/he would not 
otherwise have done.  It is not entirely clear from this charge (and the matter was not tested on 
ĂƉƉĞĂů ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ>ŽƌĚDĐůƵƐŬĞǇ ?Ɛ view is that the accused simply does not have mens rea  ? “Ɛ ?ŚĞĚŝĚ
ŶŽƚ ŝŶƚĞŶĚ Ăƚ Ăůů ? ? Žƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŚĞ ŝƐ ĨĂůůŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ dole.  This was defined by 
Baron Hume as 
that corrupt and evil intention, which is essential (so the light of 
nature teaches, and so all authorities have said) to the guilt of any 
crime  ? ?&Žƌdole to be established] the act must be attended with 
such circumstances as indicate a corrupt and malignant disposition, 
a heart contemptuous of order and regardless of social duty.60 
In other words, it is not obvious, examining this dictum from Raiker, whether the jury was to 
understand that coercion elides the intention itself or merely ŝƚƐ  “Ğǀŝů ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? (The co-accused in 
the case were charged, inter alia, with a number of assaults arising from a prison riot and hostage-
taking.)  The former, more straightforward interpretation is more likely, given that the case occurred 
prior to Drury ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ŶĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ĂŶĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ ŵŽƌĂů ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ  ?ƚŚĞ  “Ğǀŝů ?ŽĨ  “Ğǀŝů
intent ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐƚŚĞmens rea of assault) had not, in 1989, been canvassed in Scots law.  The idea 
that extreme fear would, or could, paralyse the exercise of moral and rational constraint seems to be 
taken for granted. 
In charging the jury in the earlier case of Thomson, the trial judge had used a similar formulation.  
dŚĂƚĐĂƐĞǁĂƐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚďƵƚƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚƚŚĞ  “essence [of] the 
                                                          
58 Ibid 154 
59 dŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌǁĂƐƚŽƵĐŚĞĚŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƚƌŝĂůũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůĐŽƵƌƚŝŶThomson (n 56) where Lord 
,ƵŶƚĞƌƐĂŝĚ “I leave out of account situations where evil intent is manifestly absent ? for example, if a person 
has been compelled by sheer physical force to place his hand on a weapon with which others have inflicted a 
wound on a victim ? ?ibid 72) 
60 Hume (n 20) 21, 22 
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view of the law taken and applied by the trial judge ? ?61 As part of his charge he (Lord Hunter) had 
ƐĂŝĚ P “if a defence of this sort as a complete defence leading to an acquittal is to succeed the will and 
resolution of the accused must, in fact, have been overborne and overcome by the threats and the 
danger. ?62  dŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ǁŝůů ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ŚĞůƉĨƵů ŝŶ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ
relates to mind or act.  Nonetheless, both juries (in Raiker and in Thomson) would have understood 
that, for coercion to succeed, the fear generated must have been so strong that it interacted with 
(indeed overrode) ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌŽǁŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?On this explanation, then, 
the relationship between the defence and, certainly, the mens rea, is particularly close.  As with 
automatism, if there is no mens rea then the Crown has not proved its case.  It is hard to see, 
conceptually, how it is possible to say that mens rea has been established but, subsequently 
considering the defence of coercion, in fact, the extreme fear meant that the mental element was 
not made out.  Either the accused has mens rea or s/he does not. 
Ultimately, however, on appeal, Thomson63 fell back on a straightforwardly factual interpretation of 
coercion,64 which served to reinforce its separation from mens rea.  The key point was that not only 
must the threats themselves be made contemporaneously with the commission of the crime but the 
(irresistible) danger which will result from non-compliance must also be bearing down on the 
accused.65  dŚĞ “ŐƵŶƚŽƚŚĞŚĞĂĚ ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌe, the classic example.  Coercion then, on this 
analysis, would sit clearly within the traditional actus reus + mens rea = offence equation, with the 
defence itself falling to be considered once the commission of the offence has, prima facie, been 
established. 
This analysis of its operation was affirmed in the case of Cochrane v HM Advocate66 which moved 
even ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂǁĂǇ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨĞĂƌ ŝƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐŽŶ ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ
ability personally to decide to commit the crime.  Cochrane, one of few cases outwith the game of 
Cluedo where a candlestick was used as a weapon (here, in a robbery), arose from relatively non-
specific (and probably future) threats67 made against an accused who was, on a formal psychological 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?  “ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶƚ ?68 and therefore much more likely than members of the general 
population to be persuaded  W and terrified  W by such intimidation.  The appeal court held, faced with 
                                                          
61 Thomson (n 56) 80 (LJ-C Wheatley) 
62 Ibid 75 (LJ-C Wheatley quoting Lord Hunter).  See also Chalmers and Leverick (n 23) para 5.04 where they 
argue that coercion does not operate to negate mens rea 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid 77-80 
65 Some elements of the threat on which the accused sought to rely related to future events.  Ibid 76 
66 2001 SCCR 655 
67 /ŶƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐŽǁŶǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞĂůůĞŐĞĚĐŽĞƌĐĞƌŚĂĚƐĂŝĚ “If you don't [carry out the robbery], I'll hammer 
you and blow your house up ?ibid [6] 
68 Ibid [7] (LJ-G Rodger) 
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these facts, that the test for coercion was primarily objective, stating it tŽďĞ P “whether an ordinary 
sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused, would have 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚĚŝĚ ? ?69  It elucidated the matter further as follows: 
Therefore, in a case where the accused lacks reasonable firmness, the jury 
must disregard that particular characteristic but have regard to his other 
characteristics. At the same time I bear firmly in mind that the judge is entitled 
to have regard to all the accused's characteristics in determining what 
punishment, if any, is appropriate in the particular circumstances.70 
 
By definition, objective tests focus attention away from the effect of exculpatory factors on the 
accused him or herself.  The concern is, primarily, on hypothesising as to how such factors would 
have affected an individual regarded as representative of the general population  W ĂŶ  “ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?
person or, in coercion, ĂŶ  “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŽŶĞ ǁŚŽ ŝƐ  “ƐŽďĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŽĨ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ? ? In other 
ǁŽƌĚƐ P  “[h]eroic qualities are not required by the law in this context, nor is allowance made for 
excessive cowardice or timidity. ?71 
dŚĞ ũƵƌǇ ?Ɛ ƚĂƐŬ ŝƐ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ the relevant ordinary person also shares the 
characteristics of the accused.  Since it is logically impossible for an individual to be, simultaneously 
 “ŽĨ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶƚ ? ? ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ƚŽ
levels of bravery are to be disregarded for the purpose of coercion. 
The insistence on objectivism does assist, however, in clarifying the relationship between actus reus, 
mens rea and coercion and the operation of the defence on the elements of the crime.  If the 
concern is specifically not with the effect on the accused of the threats and the resultant fear but 
rather on what would have been their effect on the defined representative of the general 
population, then the defence is clearly detached from the prior question of whether the elements of 
the crime have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.  The Crown must prove that the accused, 
individually, carried out the proscribed act and that s/he did this with the proscribed mental 
attitude.  The defence is only slightly concerned with whether the threat operated to elide either 
element.  Rather, it is focused more on the acceptability generally of such a claim in the context 
created by the circumstances of the case.  It is here that we can identify the normative component: 
ŝŶƚŚĞ  “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƐŽďĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞ ůĂǁŝƐƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨ
stoicism or courage which all citizens should meet. 
                                                          
69 Ibid [29] (LJ-G Rodger) 
70 Ibid [30] (LJ-G Rodger) 
71 Thomson (n 56) 72 (Lord Hunter  W ƚƌŝĂůũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? 
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It is submitted, therefore, that the objective approach brings into the spotlight the reasons for 
permitting a defence of coercion both generally and in the individual case.  In Cochrane, for example, 
the psychological evidence was that 
the appellant had 'most certainly not' wanted to behave in the manner that he 
did at the time of the offence. [The expert psychological witness] added that 
he believed that the appellant had believed that he would be assaulted and 
that his house would be blown up. The appellant had been of the belief that he 
would be quite severely assaulted if he did not behave in the manner he was 
instructed to.72 
tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞĨĞĂƌŚĂĚ ? ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ?ŶĞŐĂƚĞĚŽĐŚƌĂŶĞ ?Ɛmens rea is debatable but the matter 
was not at issue.  Coercion weighs the quality of the threat and the nature of the fear which it 
generates in their own right ?KŶůǇŝĨƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƚŽƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?ĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐŽǁŶ
response to them, will the defence be made out.  There is no direct effect on presence or absence of 
the core elements of the crime.  Coercion stands alone to be determined subsequently.  The only 
overlap (or collapse of mens rea and coercion into each other) might arise if the accused claimed 
that s/he did not have the relevant mental element at all.  In most cases, however, absent a claim of 
hypnotic control or the equivalent, this is unlikely to be successful because the accused will have 
taken a decision to carry out the crime (albeit in preference to succumbing to the danger 
threatened).  These issues  W of danger, choice and objectivism  W are also prominent in the defence of 
necessity which will now be considered. 
 
Necessity 
Until the case of Moss v Howdle73 in 1997, necessity was ill-defined in Scots law.  Compared to 
international, historical cases involving tales of cannibalism74 and shipwreck,75 Moss ?ƐĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƐƉĞĞĚŝŶŐ
on the M74 motorway) are prosaic.  Nonetheless, it brought some precision to the law, confirming, 
at its outset, that the defence is available, in appropriate circumstances, for all crimes.  It did this by 
rejecting the possible interpretation of Thomson76 that a defence based in any form of duress was 
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŽŶůǇĨŽƌ “ĂƚƌŽĐŝŽƵƐĐƌŝŵĞƐ ? ?77  The charge in Moss related to an offence of strict liability78 
and the court had no difficulty in determining that necessity could be pled.  It can be inferred from 
this that necessity cannot operate to negate mens rea  W or, at least, that this could not be its only 
                                                          
72 Cochrane (n 66) [7] 
73 (n 55) 
74 R v Dudley &Stephens (1884) 4 QBD 273 
75 United States v Holmes (1842) 
76 (n 56) 
77 Ibid 78.  See Moss (n 55) 126 (LJ-G Rodger) 
78 Motorway Speed (Regulations) 1974, SI 1974/502, reg 3 
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function  W since, by definition, strict liability offences are established by commission of a criminal act 
only.  Coercion, as has been discussed, arises when the accused is faced with life-threatening 
violence.  Necessity can be pled in a broader range of circumstances.  The severity of the threat must 
be as desperate79 ďƵƚŝƚŵĂǇĂƌŝƐĞĨƌŽŵ “some contingency such as a natural disaster or illness rather 
than from the deliberate threats of another. ?80  It is ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ “consistent with the ethos of [the 
Scottish] system ?81 that the defence should be capable of use where the actions were to save a third 
party rather than the accused him or herself.  Finally, if any alternative course of action existed 
which would have been lawful, the defence will not succeed.82 
Necessity builds, in some respects, on the principles of coercion as set down in Thomson83 however 
it is fair to say that the nature of the fear generated by the extreme danger is likely to be slightly 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ůŝĨĞ ŶĞĞĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌed  W altruistic action is equally 
acceptable.  Also, the range of possible responses to the danger is likely to be broader.  In coercion, 
the coercer seeks to force the commission of a particular crime.  In necessity, the accused may have 
a number of alternative courses of action available and, given that the defence fails if any of these 
would have been legal, there is a greater element of choice and greater rationality is expected.  This 
can be seen in the case of Dawson v Dickson84 where Lord Sutherland stated that: 
the defence of necessity only arises when there is a conscious dilemma faced 
by a person who has to decide between saving life or avoiding serious body 
harm on the one hand and breaking the law on the other hand. If, in the 
circumstances of the case, he elects to break the law rather than risk life, the 
defence of necessity may well be open to him.85 
This demonstrates the separation between mens rea and necessity.  There is no suggestion that fear 
ŽǀĞƌƌŽĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĚĞĐŝĚĞ ƚŽĐŽŵŵit the ĐƌŝŵĞ ?  ZĂƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ  “ĞůĞĐƚ ?ŝŽŶ ? ? ŝƐ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů.  
The possible courses of action available for avoiding the danger are recognised to be limited but the 
accused still has choice and control over which of these to choose.  Dawson turned on this element 
of choice.  In fact, ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨthe crime (careless driving under the influence of 
alcohol) was not because the danger was so pressing that offending was his only option.  He had not, 
in fact, thought about the danger (which, nonetheless, did exist) at all and would have driven 
regardless.  The absence of a (personal) dilemma was fatal to the use of the defence. 
                                                          
79 According to Lord Justice-'ĞŶĞƌĂůZŽĚŐĞƌ ? “the minimum requirement of any defence of this kind is that the 
ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚĂĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨĚĞĂƚŚŽƌŐƌĞĂƚďŽĚŝůǇŚĂƌŵ ? ?Moss (n 55) 126 
80 Ibid 128 (LJ-G Rodger) 
81 Ibid 128 (LJ-G Rodger) 
82 Ibid 129-30 
83 (n 56) 
84 1999 JC 315 
85 Ibid 318 
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The clear distinction between the offence elements and necessity is also accentuated in the Lord 
ĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ  ?EŽ  ? ŽĨ  ? ? ?0)86 which adopted an objective approach, similar to that of 
Cochrane in relation to the effect which the danger had to have.  The case related to a charge of 
malicious mischief where nuclear protestors had boarded a naval ship berthed in Loch Goil and, inter 
alia, thrown equipment overboard.  They argued that they had had to do so to prevent another 
crime: the use of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom which, they asserted, would have been 
contrary to customary international law. 
According to Lord ProsƐĞƌ ?  “the defence will only be available if a sober person of reasonable 
firmness, sharing the characteristics of the actor, would have responded as he did ?87 showing the 
ůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “different people respond to danger in different ways. ?88  In the same way as 
for coercion, then, this objective approach affirms the separation between the elements of any 
offence and the defence of necessity. 
Overall, necessity, having been adapted from the (historical) principles of coercion is possibly more 
stringent than it needs to be, given that individuals may be faced with dangers which are not in any 
way life-threatening but which might still reasonably be countered with minor breaches of the 
criminal law.89  Equally, if the (criminal) course of action is reasonable in all the circumstances, it is 
harsh that it will not exculpate if any other legal way of proceeding could be identified.90  
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this strict and objective formulation leaves intact the separation 
between the elements of the offence and the defence of necessity.  Commenting on the Lord 
ĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?ƐZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?EŽ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?, Chalmers said: 
in [this case which was] the first major criminal appeal decision since Drury, 
... the traditional tripartite analysis of criminal offences was reaffirmed. ... 
[T]he court was adamant that a defence of necessity would not affect the 
mens rea of malicious mischief. Instead, it operates as a freestanding 
defence. The mens rea of malicious mischief is simply intention or 
recklessness. There is no question, it seems, of malicious mischief requiring 
 “ŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶƚŚĞŶďĞƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚŶŽŶ-malicious if the accused 
believed that his actions were justified. That, it is submitted, is the correct 
                                                          
86 2001 JC 143 
87 Ibid [42] 
88 Ibid [43] 
89 ^ĞĞ'ĞƌĂůĚ'ŽƌĚŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶMoss (n 70) 1997 SCCR 215, 224.  See also Ruxton v Lang 1998 SCCR 1 
and D v Donnelly 2009 SLT 476 in both of which cases the appeal court ruled that the danger had passed so 
thaƚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ŝŶĞĂĐŚ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
may have been that she was not (yet) safe. 
90 ^ĞĞsŝĐƚŽƌdĂĚƌŽƐ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĞĨĞŶĐĞƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚƐƌŝŵŝŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Edin LR 60, 68 
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approach -- but at the same time, it is entirely inconsistent with the Drury 
analysis.91 
 
Conclusion 
The approach taken by Drury92 to the offence / defence structure in Scots criminal law is not 
replicated in relation to other defences.  Automatism, coercion and necessity each provide good 
reasons for exculpating an accused person.  In the latter two, the objectivism of the defence 
definition actually serves to spotlight the importance of having such reasons.  Where the defence is 
not coŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ?Ɛown response to extreme danger but rather with that of an 
 “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂŶǇĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞactus reus and the mens rea on the one hand, and 
the defence on the other is, necessarily, attenuated.  This brings about a more detached focus on 
whether the reasons for allowing exoneration are actually good ones.  Coercion and necessity both 
exculpate a criminal response to extreme danger.  Both are restrictive.  The reported cases show few 
successful pleas.  In coercion, the outstanding question is whether a more subjective response could 
still strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the accused and the public interest.  In 
necessity, calls for a relaxation of the stringency of the tests where the danger (and the response) 
are not of death or great bodily harm should be considered.  Automatism, rightly, recognises the 
unfairness of convicting an accused where s/he has been unable to exercise rational control over 
his/her actions through no fault attributable to him/her.  It would benefit from greater clarity in 
relation to the internal/external factor distinction. 
In general, Drury, while an interesting examination of the criminal law of homicide in its historical 
context, did little to clarify or elucidate the principles of general defences in the criminal law of 
Scotland.  It did, however, serve to focus attention on their operation, at least in homicide, a 
worthwhile exercise which has been carried forward here.  Ultimately, automatism, coercion and 
necessity accord with the traditional structure of criminal law and procedure which postpones 
consideration of any defence until the offence elements (actus reus and mens rea) have, at least 
prima facie, been made out by the prosecution.  While the relationship to mens rea may sometimes 
be close and direct, the view taken here is that the separation of defences is most conducive to 
fairness in the administration of justice. 
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